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The Han Minzu, Fragmented Identities,
and Ethnicity
AGNIESZKA JONIAK-LÜTHI
This paper focuses on the majority population in the People’s Republic of China—the Han—
and their various collective identities. The Han play a pivotal role in consolidating the
Chinese territory and the multiethnic Chinese nation. Therefore, the governments in
the twentieth century have invested substantial efforts in promoting a unitary Han iden-
tity. In spite of that, powerful local identities related to native place, occupation, and
family histories persist. This essay traces these identities and analyzes their intertwine-
ment. Further, it discusses the question of ethnicity of both the Han and local identity cat-
egories, and concludes that while Han enact ethnicity in their relations to other minzu,
local identity categories are more social than ethnic. It further posits that moments of con-
frontation, “degree” of ethnicity, scales of categorization, and relationality of identities are
notions that should be given particular attention in the studies of ethnicity in China and
elsewhere.
THE HAN minzu,
1 translated variously as nationality or ethnic group, constitutes offi-
cially 91.5 percent of China’s population. The Han are recognized by the state as the
national majority and the core of the Chinese multiethnic nation. Besides the Han, the
Chinese nation is comprised of many other minzu, including Zhuang, Mongols,
Uyghur, Tibetans, and Hui, collectively referred to as “national minorities” (shaoshu
minzu). Current representations of the Han as a national majority tend to reify them
as a coherent group that has evolved through millennia to become the nation’s core
today. While scholars have demonstrated that the history of “the Han” is anything but
linear,2 the Communist central governments have consistently represented them as a
coherent, historically constituted community. In so doing, they have followed in the
footsteps of early twentieth-century intellectuals and revolutionaries who were
motivated by and spread a vision of the Han as a national community originating from
one ancestor (the legendary Yellow Emperor) and forming one gigantic national
Agnieszka Joniak-Lüthi (joniak@anthro.unibe.ch) is Post-doctoral Researcher at the Institute of Social Anthro-
pology, University of Bern.
1Minzu is a complex term that can be translated as “nation,” “nationality,” or “ethnic group,”
depending on the time and circumstances in which it is used. In China, there are fifty-six minzu
that have been recognized by the state after the extensive Minzu Classification Project in the
1950s. The Han minzu constitutes 91.5 percent of the entire Chinese population and is thus the
largest minzu.
2For examples see contributions by Mark Elliott, C. Patterson Giersch, and James Leibold in the
recent Critical Han Studies volume (2012).
The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 72, No. 4 (November) 2013: 849–871.
© The Association for Asian Studies, Inc., 2013 doi:10.1017/S0021911813001095
s
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
ht
tp
:/
/b
or
is
.u
ni
be
.c
h/
43
64
9/
 
| 
do
wn
lo
ad
ed
: 
13
.3
.2
01
7
lineage.3 The idea that the Han nation would become the backbone of the first post-
imperial state in China undergirded the nationalists’ efforts in the Xinhai Revolution of
1911.
However, while “Han-ness” is still today a handy political category for nation- and
state-making projects, it was not invented a century ago solely for nation-making pur-
poses. Though highly unstable in its scope and meaning, it was also a meaningful identity
in the pre-1911 period, widely utilized in negotiations on social positioning by those who
identified with it in local as well as empire-wide contexts. Likewise, today its meaning and
roles continue to extend beyond national politics.
This essay reflects on Han-ness by focusing on its fissures. Like much recent work on
the Han, it counters the category’s conceived homogeneity; to do so, I focus specifically
on the fragmented local identities of those who have been classified by the state as
Hanzu.4 Most of these local identity categories are related to native place or region of
origin (e.g., as “natives of Shanghai,” “natives of Henan,” “Southerners”), or locality in
general (as “locals” vs. “migrants”). My study is thus related to earlier research carried
out by Honig (1992), Goodman (1995), Faure and Siu (1995), and Constable (1996),
insofar as it draws attention to diversity of local identities. Yet, it also moves beyond
this research by exploring the meanings of these local identities, the power dynamic
that exists between local identities and the Han identity, and the politics that influences
these negotiations.
Another objective of this paper is to explore the question of ethnicity. Are the
Han an ethnic group? Are local identities ethnic too? I argue that it is crucial to
put aside the term “ethnic group” and turn first to local terms as categories of analysis.
These will allow us to see the complex networks of relationships that link these iden-
tities in local contexts and to explore the question of ethnicity from the perspective of
their relationality.
Unlike many other studies of the Han, which draw on historical sources and other
written materials to trace the ethno-genesis of the category and its fragmented histories,
this study is based on ethnographic interviews and observation, and focuses on contem-
porary Han. My analysis is based on ninety-one interviews I carried out in the winter of
2003 in Beijing and Shanghai, and on my observations from numerous research trips in
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1996. During these fieldwork trips, I was
often struck by the vivid presence of local identities and by the importance the Han
attached to them. My research interests developed from so many conversations and
observations, and I came to focus on the meaning and roles of minzu identity on the
one hand and of local identities on the other. During the interviews, I inquired about
names (under “names” I understand in this paper mainly socionyms and thus use these
two terms interchangeably) for local identity categories and their stereotypical character-
istics and associations. My informants also discussed with me the “pairs of opposition” the
categories formed (e.g., Southerners vs. Northerners, urban Han vs. rural Han). In the
3For detailed analyses of this process, see Duara (1995), Chow (2001), Leibold (2006), and Harri-
son (2001). See also Rhoads (2000) for an analysis that draws on the perspective of Manchu-Han
relations. Finally, Gladney (1994) draws attention to the importance of the Minzu Recognition
Project in the 1950s in the making of the Hanzu.
4Hanzu is a corruption of the compound Han minzu. Hanzu are the members of the Han minzu.
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section below, I introduce the factors that led me to focus on names and stereotypes, and
on the methodologies that connect them to broader anthropological research on cate-
gorization and identity.
FUNCTIONS OF STEREOTYPES AND NAMES
Naming and stereotyping “us” and “them” are inherent parts of the processes of cat-
egorization and reification, both of which are intimately bound to social positioning and
power distribution. Stereotypes and names (socionyms, ethnonyms, and nationyms) arise
during the processes of self- and other-identification. In that sense, they are a universal
part of social, ethnic, and national categorization and boundary-making processes. Bour-
dieu (1991, 240) points out that names of groups “record a particular stage of struggles
and negotiations over the official designations and the material and symbolic advantages
associated with them.” Moreover, he argues that agents will “resort to practical and sym-
bolic strategies aimed at maximizing the symbolic profit of naming” (240). I believe a
similar struggle over symbolic resources associated with names takes place as well in
the unofficial spaces between competing social and ethnic categories. The identity
labels “native of Beijing” or “native of Shanghai” are proudly enacted, as they connote
political centrality and economic advancement. On the other hand, labels like “Sichuan
rats” or “Henan vagabonds,” associated with migrants from two impoverished and over-
populated provinces, will be employed by others to generate and reify certain social hier-
archies of local identity categories.
Similarly to naming, the aim of stereotyping is to construct and objectify certain
social orders and social relations. This aim is achieved when the actors begin to recognize
vague differences as significant and crucial, or when they believe differences exist where
there are in fact none (Tajfel 1969, 82; compare Barth [1969] 1996). Accordingly,
although differences between, for instance, “natives of Beijing” and “natives of Shanghai”
may not be apparent, the collected stereotypes reveal powerful beliefs that the two cat-
egories differ diametrically and thoroughly. Hence, stereotypes and names possess reify-
ing and naturalizing functions. They are both instruments and effects of complex power
struggles.
Stereotypes are based on the belief that all members of a given category are alike,
homogeneous, and predictable on the basis of their membership in that category
(Oakes, Haslam, and Turner 1994, 102). Yet, they are not fixed, final images. When
the sociopolitical frame changes, new stereotypes will gradually come into being. The
competition-focused theories argue that stereotypes are strategic devices employed in
certain contexts by individuals, as well as social, ethnic, or national groupings to
achieve certain ends. Thus, they are tightly bound to questions of power and social posi-
tioning. In the 1960s, Sherif (1967, 152) suggested that stereotypes should be understood
as products of competition between social groups over material resources. A number of
scholars later extended his argument to include the competition over symbolic resources
(Tajfel et al. 1971, 172), arguing that “[s]tatus, self-esteem and beliefs override objective
benefits in importance” (Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron 1994, 52–53). While I find the
notions of status and self-esteem crucial to stereotyping, they significantly do not explain
the not uncommon cases where members of a category hold negative stereotypes of
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themselves while maintaining positive ones of others. As a response to competition-
focused theories’ inability to explain the phenomenon of negative self-stereotyping, Jost
and Banaji (1994) suggest yet another function of stereotypes as devices that maintain
the existing status quo, even at the expense of a group’s or one’s personal interest.
Stereotypes are thus employed to naturalize social, ethnic, and national constructs; to
reify social status quos; to justify existing relationships within social, ethnic, or national
systems; and also to meaningfully (to the actors) explain social processes and events
(Hoffman and Hurst 1990, 206; Jost and Banaji 1994, 20; Tajfel 1981). The justificative
function refers to the phenomenon of ascribing specific stereotypes to a group to justify
certain behaviors and attitudes towards it; for example, “natives of Subei” are discrimi-
nated against on the eastern Chinese job market due to their reported “backwardness”
and “dishonesty.” Moreover, stereotypes function also as “causal explanators,” allowing
for a subjectively meaningful understanding of events through stereotype-based identifi-
cation of responsible actors. Accordingly, the business success of an individual from Zhe-
jiang Province is surely to be ascribed to the reported “natural business talent” of “natives
of Zhejiang.” Hence, stereotypes as well as names are subjectively accurate, subjectively
meaningful representations of social, ethnic, and national categories and relations
between them. They reflect and order the worldview of the persons and groups that
reproduce them, shrouding their logics of action and argumentation in an aura of see-
mingly obvious, universal conclusions (Oakes and Reynolds 1997, 64, 70; Spears et al.
1997, 5).
In the present study, I focus on the stereotypes and names ascribed to local identity
categories of the people classified officially as Han. First of all, the collected names and
stereotypes signal what sort of local identity categories are socially significant and mean-
ingful. They also indicate what boundaries fragment the imagined category of the Hanzu
classification. Further, I briefly identify from the research material the ways in which my
informants draw on these names and stereotypes to position themselves and others in the
hierarchies of power that exist among theHanzu. Finally, the meaning of stereotypes and
names offers us a glimpse into topics that matter in the differentiation between various
local identity categories.
NATIVE PLACE AND IDENTITY
The majority of names and stereotypes I collected during interviews referred to
locality-bound identity categories, woven around the concept of native place. Hence, it
is essential to here focus briefly on the identification with native place. A significant
number of interviewees pointed to the “native-place-determined mindset” ( jiaxiang
guannian), basically the notion that people originating in one native place are imbued
with the same “essence” that makes them bound to it and similar to each other, as the
main principle guiding the Han idea of diversity. Both Chinese and Western scholars
widely agree that native place bonds play an important role in the ways Han identify
themselves and others. Several studies have discussed the role native place bonds play
in the economic, social, and ethnic organization and differentiation among the Han
(see Fei 1992; Giersch 2012; Gladney 1998; Goodman 1995; Ho 1966; Honig 1992;
Leong 1997; Liu 2003; Naquin and Rawsky 1987; J. Watson 1988; Yi 2002).
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The key concepts in this discourse of native place are jiaxiang, guxiang, and jiguan.
The first two terms, jiaxiang and guxiang, have a similar meaning: “hometown” or “native
place.” The latter of the two also means “birthplace.”5 The concepts of jiaxiang and
guxiang are more flexible and individual-oriented than the third term, jiguan. Ji here
refers to “record,” “registry,” or “register,” while guan means “being linked together,”
or “following in the continuous line.”6 Although jiguan could be translated as one’s
native place too, it rather refers to the locality identified as ancestral land along the patri-
line, the place where the family’s name comes from and where, especially in southern
China, the ancestral hall is located.
Fei Xiaotong (1992, 121–27) argued that the Han bond with a place, and more
broadly with a region of origin, should be understood as an extension of consanguinity
into space. Indeed, descendants inherit the jiguan of the father, even if they are born
and live thousands of kilometers away. Lin Yutang, an early twentieth-century philoso-
pher, approached the issue from a similar perspective. He argued:
From the love of the family there grew a love for the clan, and from the love for
the clan there developed an attachment for the land where one was born. Thus a
sentiment arose which may be called “provincialism”, in Chinese called t’ungh-
siang kuannien [tongxiang guannian], or “the idea of being from the same native
place”. . . . Fundamentally, they spring from the family psychology and do not
depart from the family pattern. It is the family mind enlarged so as to make
some measure of civic cooperation possible. (Lin 1998, 198)7
The reasons why the Han consider their native place such an important part of
their identity are multiple. Granet ([1929] 1988, 22–23) has emphasized the strength
of the tie between the people and the land already in ancient China. Like family ties,
the ties between a lineage and its ancestral land were very strong and charged with
obligations (R. Watson 1988). Commonly owned, lineage land could not be easily
sold or leased. Like Fei Xiaotong, Granet argues that this led to a formation of
spatial consanguinity that had its source in the sharing of the same “life essence” by
those living on the same portion of land. It was believed that this essence was
absorbed by people during meals that included foods produced on the local soil
(Granet [1929] 1988, 47).
Further, I believe that filial obligation, ancestral worship, and the household regis-
tration system also converged to reinforce native place bonds. In order to fulfill filial obli-
gations, male descendants were theoretically obliged to come back to their native place to
5Jia translates as “family,” “household,” “home,” “people who share the same surname,” or
“surname.” Gu refers to “services of offering sacrifices,” “the old,” “former,” or “ancient.” The
last element, xiang, indicates a “village,” “native place,” or “hometown.” Goodman (1995, 2, 4)
also mentions other terms like sangzi (“native place”), laojia (“old home,” “native place”), or
yuanji (“ancestral home,” “native place”).
6Zuji, where zu means “ancestors” and ji, as above, is “record” or “registry,” is a term similar to
jiguan.
7Territorial bonds, like kinship bonds, come into play in economic life (Fei 1980, 95). Also, Ho
Ping-ti (1966, 120) points out that common native place, together with kinship ties, used to be
the most important basis for voluntary association.
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conduct certain ceremonies in ancestral halls located on the lineage’s land, even if they
had moved away in the course of their lives. Some migrants sought ways to bend this
inconvenient obligation and carried elements of ancestral halls with them to rebuild
them in new locations. Even then, however, the concept of native place and the bonds
that linked family members to it were not neglected. They remained of vital importance,
even when a new ancestral hall was built in a new location.
The household registration system was another element that tied people to the land
—in this case, via the disposition of certain rights and obligations. Leong (1997, 21) has
pointed out that imperial China developed mechanisms to limit migration and the
freedom of movement because an earthbound population “facilitated record keeping,
the extraction of resources and manpower, and the maintenance of social order and
imperial security.” Migration was thus perceived as a transgression against the law and
worthy of punishment; migrants were accused of avoiding payment of taxes and fulfill-
ment of obligatory labor. Under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the government strictly
enforced the law that required household registration in one’s native place. At this time,
the penal code identified “fugitive households” (taohu) and “displaced people” (liumin) as
lawbreakers. From the reign of the emperor Wanli (1573–1620) onward, policy began to
change, and displaced people were given resident status (ruji) and the right to own or
lease land. Also the Communist regime after 1958 introduced a strict control of popu-
lation mobility (especially from rural to urban areas) by the means of the hukou
system (permanent household registration). Though this system was gradually relaxed
after 1978, hukou transfer is still restricted, especially in regard to migration from
rural to urban areas.
The “native-place-determined mindset,” a projection that native place imbues
people originating in one area with an “essence” that makes them bound to it and
similar to each other, was very popular among my informants. A significant
number of my interviewees believed that people sharing the same native place
(be it a town, city, province, or broader geographical region) share a kind of primor-
dial “quintessence.” Below, I demonstrate the ways in which this “native-place-
determined mindset” is explicitly manifest in the names and stereotypes employed
by the Han.
NAMES, STEREOTYPES, AND TOPOGRAPHIES OF IDENTITY
When embarking on my research, I expected that place-boundedness and the impor-
tance of native place had diminished under the contemporary influence of immense edu-
cational and professional migration in China. I imagined that the social changes of the
past two decades had weakened their significance greatly, especially among the
younger generations. Against my expectations, however, a clear majority of my intervie-
wees turned to “regional cultures” (diyu wenhua) and place-related socionyms when
identifying and categorizing themselves and other Hanzu. Informants used very broad
classifications, like Northerners (Beifangren) and Southerners (Nanfangren), or urban
and rural Han, but also more spatially limited identifiers like Shanghairen (“natives of
Shanghai,” “people of Shanghai”), Henanren (“natives of Henan Province”), Taiwanren,
Subeiren, and so on, with the suffix ren rendering the meaning of “native of” or, more
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generally, a “person” or “people.” The “native-place-determined mindset” was often a
topic of our conversations, and interviewees took great pleasure in explaining it to me.
They provided numerous examples of names and nicknames for different native-place
categories (including those they self-identified with), listing stereotypical characteristics
and describing their relations with other categories. Although I tried to point out
non-place-related categories (e.g., Tangren—“people of the Tang dynasty,” a designation
apparently popular in the South and abroad), these efforts elicited little response frommy
informants.
Most of the socionyms collected refer to locality-bound categories associated with
provinces, cities, autonomous regions, and geographic regions. Further, these names
indicate clearly perceived (as judged by the frequency with which they were mentioned)
“pairs of oppositions”: Northerners vs. Southerners, rural vs. urban Han, locals vs. outsi-
ders/migrants. Also the category of Mainlanders (Han living in mainland China), as
opposed to Taiwanese and Hongkongese, was mentioned by a number of interviewees.
For an overview of identity categories signaled by names and a succinct sample of con-
crete socionyms, please refer to Figure 1.
The actual meaning of socionyms was quite diverse and included references to cul-
tural discourse, history, economy, wealth and attitudes towards money, occupation, topo-
graphy, character traits, physical build, language, and migration. Figure 2 offers a more
careful examination of the meaning of names, as well as examples of the socionyms that
illustrate them.
My interviewees also introduced the “characteristics” of the categories they
identified through socionyms. During our conversations, this stereotyping occurred
without any great deliberation or hesitation. Gauging from the ease with which my
informants suggested these characterizations in our interviews, it is apparent that
stereotyping, like naming, constitutes a familiar element of everyday social inter-
actions. The “characteristics” or stereotypic associations I collected during the inter-
views comprise an enormous body of data, one that would be impossible to analyze
here. I thus focus in this paper on identifying topics that surfaced repeatedly in a
great number of stereotypes and socionyms, thereby signaling the aspects that are sig-
nificant for differentiation between these identity categories and for the processes of
boundary-making between them. Figure 3 displays topics that the stereotypes
referred to most often and some examples of concrete stereotypes quoted directly
from the interviews.
A significant number of interviewees shared the idea that “regional cultures”
(diyu wenhua), typically imagined as geographically limited portions of the Han
population, share a set of historically and ecologically determined characteristics.
These characteristics in a sense predestine people within specific “regional cultures”
for certain careers and occupations. For instance, Beijingren were believed to be
destined to find employment as officials and bureaucrats, Shanghairen and Guang-
dongren as businesspeople, Anhuiren as household helpers, and Sichuanren as
small-scale traders. Another theme extensively utilized by interviewees to differen-
tiate between local identity categories was “culture” (wenhua), especially notions of
“cultural level” (wenhua shuiping) and “cultural quality” (wenhua suzhi). While the
former often refers to one’s level of schooling, the latter is much more complex.
The interviewees’ understanding of “cultural quality” included the meaning of
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culture in the Confucian sense,9 along with topical issues pertaining to economic
success and modernity (xianjin). The closest identification to culture in the sense
of rituals, courtesy, good manners, etiquette, and education was ascribed to natives
of Beijing by both Beijingren themselves and by others. However, while Beijingren
tended to brag about it, others remarked that it made Beijingren lazy and arrogant,
conservative big-talkers but “small doers.” Han from the South, a collective category
Figure 1. A sample of identity categories signaled by the socionyms.
Identity categories signaled by socionyms Selected examples of concrete socionyms
Province-bound Hubeilao (“Hubei fellow”)
Luren (“native of Lu kingdom”; referring to
Shandong Province today)
Xinjiangren (“native of Xinjiang”)
City-bound Ala (“we” in Shanghai dialect; also indicates
linguistic identification with the Shanghai
dialect)
Beijingren (“native of Beijing”)
Northerners vs. Southerners Kuazi (“clumsy fellows”; referring to the Han
from the North)
Beilao (“fellows from the North”)
Nan manzi (“southern barbarians”)
Rural migrants vs. urban Han Xiao shimin (“petty townsfolk”; refers to natives
of Shanghai)
Shamao (“silly billy”; used by natives of Beijing
towards rural migrants)
Guazi (“dummies”; used by natives of Xi’an
towards rural migrants)
Xiangxiaren (“provincialists,” “rustics”)
Locals vs. outsiders/migrants Bendiren (“local person,” “native person”; used
by a native of Shanghai)
Waidiren (generally “non-locals,” “outsiders”;
used by natives of Shanghai)
Lata (“from here”; used by an interviewee from
Subei8)
Zhongguo de Jipusairen (lit. “Chinese Gypsies”;
referring to Henanren)
Mainlanders vs. Taiwanese and
Hongkongese
Biaoshu (“maternal uncles”; indicating a person
from a different descent group; used by an
informant from Hong Kong; refers to
Mainlanders)
Daluren (“Mainlanders”)
Daomin (“islanders”; referring to Taiwanese)
Biesan (“wretched tramps and thieves”; refer-
ring to Hongkongese)
8On how Subei was constructed, see Honig (1996).
9On the historical notions of wenhua see Bauer (1980), Thierry (1989), Watson and Rawski (1988),
and Fairbank (1968).
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including natives of Shanghai, Taiwanese, and natives of Fujian, Guangdong, and
Zhejiang Provinces, were rarely associated with the same notion of culture as Beijing-
ren. Instead, my research participants described Han from the South as having
“respect for tradition” (chuantong), and as maintaining lineage-oriented family orga-
nization and the practices of ancestral worship. Somewhat paradoxically, these very
Southerners were simultaneously associated with development, advancement, flexi-
bility, and modernity—and to a much greater and a more explicit degree than
Han from the North, including “natives of Beijing.”
The rapid development of commerce, industry, and the service sector in southeast
China, which effected a rapid increase of wealth, particularly in urban areas, appears
Figure 2. Main thematic fields as indicated by collected socionyms.
Thematic fields referred
to by socionyms
Selected examples of concrete socionyms
Culture Manzi (“southern barbarians”)
Dalaocu (“uncouth fellows”; referring to the Han
from the Northeast)
Historical connotations Shuren (“natives of Shu kingdom”; referring to
Sichuanren)
Attitudes towards money Xiao qigui (“misers”; referring to Shanghairen)
Jiu mao jiu (“ninety-nine cents”; referring to Shan-
xiren and indicating “parsimonious”)
Work, occupation Yunnan daduxiao (“drug smugglers from Yunnan”)
Wenzhou xiao laoban (“little bosses from Wenzhou”)
Character traits La meizi (“spicy little sisters”; refers to young Sichuan
women and to their supposedly hot temper, as well
as to hot Sichuan cuisine)
Jiutouniao (“nine-head birds”; referring to Hubeiren
as reportedly shrewd and cunning)
Huo Lei Fengi10 (“living Lei Feng”; referring to the
Han from the Northeast)
Body build Xiao Sichuan (lit. “little Sichuan”)
Shandong dahan (“burly fellows from Shandong”)
Language Shanghai yazi (“Shanghai ducks”; refers to Shanghai
dialect, which reportedly sounds like the quacking
of a duck)
Bazuizi (“bigmouth”; refers to Beijingren)
Ba Min (“eight Min”; refers to Min languages
speakers)
Migration Kejia (lit. “guests,” “guest families”)11
Xilairen (“people from China’s West”)
10Lei Feng (1940–62) was reportedly a selfless young soldier who was devoted to helping people,
working for the fatherland, and studying the works of Mao. After his death in an accident, Lei Feng
was transformed through a nationwide campaign into a model hero. He was portrayed as being
hard-working, helpful, cheerful, obedient, and wholeheartedly devoted to communism.
11On Kejia, see Constable (1996).
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Figure 3. Main narratives as indicated by collected stereotypes and
examples of stereotypes.
Main topics Selected examples of stereotypes
Work, money, economy Zhejiangren (“natives of Zhejiang”) have
brains for business; Hubeiren (“natives of
Hubei”) are cunning; Henanren are lazy;
Shanxiren are the “traders of the North”;
Beijingren prefer to become officials
rather than businessmen; Xinjiangren are
oil-field workers; Wenzhouren are daring;
many Kejia work abroad
Culture, cultural level (wenhua shuiping),
cultural quality (wenhua suzhi)
Sichuanren are unsophisticated; Dongbeiren
are wild and uncivilized; Beijingren pos-
sess high “cultural quality”; Hongkongese
have no culture; Subeiren have a low
“cultural level”; urban Han are quite
civilized
Openness, flexibility, modernity Shanghairen like changes; Tianjinren are
conservative; Guangdongren are flexible;
Hongkongese are open in thinking and
well-informed; Hakka are feudal; Main-
landers are badly educated and
conservative
Tradition, respect for tradition Family lineages are very powerful in Fujian;
Taiwanese care for tradition; Hakka follow
etiquette and show filial obedience
Interpersonal relations Dongbeiren (“people from the Northeast”)
are very loyal and ready to help friends;
Hongkongese are cold and unconcerned;
Sichuanren are warm-hearted and honest
Relationships with other identity
categories
Shandongren resemble Dongbeiren; Bei-
jingren do not like Shanghairen; Zhe-
jiangren resemble Guangdongren
Languages, dialects Beijingren speak standard Chinese; Guang-
dong speech is a separate language;
Fujianren speak Minnan languages; Tian-
jinren speak with a strong dialect; Nanjing
men talk gently, “like silk”
Culinary variety Sichuanren love eating spicy foods; Guang-
dongren are gourmands; Tianjinren like
crunchy foods; Hunanren like eating spicy
foods
Physical appearance Shandongren are tall and robust; Norther-
ners are stockier than Southerners
Character traits Hangzhouren are romantic; Guangdongren
are deceptive; Shanghairen are shrewd;
Taiwanese are good-natured; Henanren
are dishonest and evil; Yunnanren seek a
carefree life; Chengduren are at ease;
people from the Central Plains are honest
and simple
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to have resulted in wariness and disgust toward agrarian occupations, sentiments that
most of my interviewees most prominently associated with the Han who originated in
the northern agricultural provinces of Hebei, Shanxi, and Henan. Rural Han from the
North were labeled as “uneducated” (wenhua shuiping di), “backward” (luohou), and
“feudal” ( fengjian). By contrast, occupations in the business sector have come to
receive more social respect. Though despised under Mao, the social regard for these
jobs changed diametrically with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the 1980s. The
increasing significance of individual wealth and economic success is reflected in the
clear categorical division between those who are “good with business” but “lack
culture” and are “detached in personal contacts” (used in reference to natives of
Fujian, Guangdong, Shanghai, Taiwan, and Hong Kong; generally, Southerners); and
those who “lack the economic spirit” and are “not hard-working” but nonetheless
remain “immersed in traditional culture” and “warm-hearted” (natives of Hebei,
Beijing, and the Northeast; generally Northerners). This opposition between the
North (Beifang) and the South (Nanfang) constitutes the central axis of stereotypic com-
parisons, despite late imperial and twentieth-century efforts to overcome it with one
“Han” ethnonym and the notion of a united minzu.12
Somewhat surprisingly, the discourse on linguistic diversity was reflected in relatively
few stereotypes, despite the great linguistic diversity of the Hanzu. This result may relate
to the fact that all of my interviewees were fluent in the national standard (Putonghua)13
and were in the course of receiving (or had already received) a tertiary education in it. It
may also suggest that for the younger, educated generation of migrating Han, linguistic
differences could be of lesser importance than earlier.
Although limited space does not allow me to comment on all the narratives, the data
I have collected offer compelling insights into categorization and identification processes
fragmenting the Han on the non-minzu scale of interaction. Stereotypes and socionyms
manifest the aspects that the research participants perceived as differentiable between
the identity categories with which they identified and with which they identified
others. While stereotypes reinforce and naturalize the boundaries between the cat-
egories, they also provide individuals with subjectively meaningful explanations of the
events and processes that affect them. Difficulties on the job market, at work, in
finding a spouse, or in taking exams can all be “explained” through the language of stereo-
types. Native place was believed to play a significant role in all of these issues. Han from
Henan Province would ascribe their difficulties on the job market to work discrimination
against Henanren. The same would be claimed by Subeiren. At the same time, others
would identify themselves as excellent businesspeople solely on account of their origin
in southern China. Still others would claim cultural superiority just because they were
“natives of Beijing.” Through this complicated game of difference and discrimination,
the fragmented Hanzu attempt to position themselves and others on the intra-Han hier-
archies of power that have very practical effects on everyday life.
12For a historical perspective on the North-South boundary see Elliott (2012).
13Putonghua (lit. “common speech”) is the national language standard referred to in the West as
“Mandarin Chinese.”
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TERMINOLOGICAL DELIBERATIONS
How to grasp in analytical terms the multitude of local identity categories, which, on
the one hand, remain in competition with one another and, on the other hand, exist
alongside a common identity as Hanzu, served as one of the central questions of my
study. There exist many different analytical approaches to this issue. A number of
researchers discuss Shanghainese, Sichuanese, Hakka, Hokkien, Cantonese, or Chao-
zhou in terms of “sub-ethnic” distinctions, divisions, or groups (J. H. Cole 1996, 161;
Moser 1985; Rowe 1984, 247; J. Watson 1988, 133). Countering this approach, Crossley
(1990, 15) and Brown (2004, 7) argue that conceiving of these categories in sub-ethnic
terms is unwarranted and misleading, as they are ethnic in their own right. Likewise,
Hakka, Hokkien, and Swatow, according to Gladney (1998, 70), and Cantonese,
Hokkien, or Boat People, according to Blake (1981) and Skinner (2001), each have exclu-
sive ethnic identities.14 Lipman (1996, 97–98) succinctly summarizes these approaches,
arguing that “conventional definitions of ethnicity cannot contain the variables – dialect,
native place, economic status, immigration history, among others – that divide and unite
groups of people in China.”
As I analyzed my research data, I at times struggled to meaningfully apply this ethnic
approach. I wondered if there were other ways by which I could analytically reconcile the
variety of non-minzu identity categories like Subeiren, Southerners, locals, urbanites, or
Hakka, with theHanminzu identification. Are they all ethnic? Inwhat follows, I offer a poss-
ible solution. In the first section, I argue that it is necessary to first put aside the reifying term
“ethnic group” and turn to Chinese-language terms in order to understand the relationship
that binds local identities to one another and to the Han minzu. In the second section, I
return to the question of ethnicity and discuss whether the categories of identity I refer to
in this paper and the relationships that bind them can be grasped with this concept.
Minzu, Ren, Min, and Jia
In this paper I have so far refrained from employing the term “ethnic group” in my
discussion of the various identity categories I identified in my research, such as North-
erners, Hongkongese, Hakka, Beijingren, Henanren, and many more. At this early
stage of my analysis, the term “ethnic group” would reify and conceal my data in troubling
ways. In this, I agree with Tapper (1988, 31), who argues that the term “ethnic group”
tends to add superfluous terminology to an already complex field: “Ethnic group, a
term brought in from western sociological discourse, is a poor translation of indigenous
categories . . . and hinders the analysis of their subtleties and ambiguities.” Thus, follow-
ing Tapper’s idea, I turned to my research material and primary literature in search of
indigenous terms for the identity categories I encountered and found four, namely:
minzu15 (“nationality,” “ethnic group,” “nation”), ren (“person,” e.g., Beijingren), min
14In Chinese publications, these terms also abound. Among them are “Han communities” (汉人社
区; Hanren shequ), “sub-groups of Hanzu” (汉族次生集团; Hanzu cisheng jituan, or汉族亚群体;
Hanzu yaqunti), “lineage groups” (族群; zuqun), “human groups” (人群; renqun), or simply
“groups” (群体; qunti). They are also referred to as “branches within the minzu” (民系; minxi).
15Minzu is actually not an indigenous category of identity sensu stricto but, rather, it was imported
from Japan at the turn of the twentieth century.
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(“person,” e.g., Danmin, lit. “Boat Person”), and jia (“person,” “family,” e.g., Kejia, lit.
“Guest Family”). In the section that follows, I focus briefly on the usage and meaning
of these four terms.
Following the immense Minzu Classification Project launched by the Communist
government in the 1950s to identify and classify the multiethnic population of the new
state, fifty-six minzu were identified. Although it is estimated that there are more than
200 ethnic groups in the PRC, only fifty-six (some of them combinations of several
ethnic groups) were officially recognized by the state and given the official denomination
as minzu (nationality).16 Hence, it has been argued that minzu are stiff categories, con-
ceived of and imposed by the state on a fluid ethnic reality. As Harrell (1989, 181)
points out, “what ultimately makes a group a minzu is that the government, more pre-
cisely the Minzu Commission . . . , says it is one.” While this is true in regard to ethnic
groups with limited access to power, as a powerful majority, the Han minzu seems to
require a different conceptual approach. The question becomes, what actors have nar-
rated the modern Han minzu into being? It is important to emphasize Wicker’s (1997,
1) argument, that
formations which appear as ethnic groups, as cultures, or as nations . . . should be
interpreted as the products of history, therefore as resulting from concrete acts
that are motivated by people’s interests. Such formations are constructions nat-
uralized by social actors in the interest of their own social standing.
Han-ness is not a modern invention, even though the Han ethnonym was at first highly
unstable. As Elliott (2012) demonstrates, only from the fifteenth century onward “Han”
began to stabilize and began to refer to both northern and southern Chinese (Zhongguo-
ren), a scope it roughly has today. In a complex interplay of local and empire-wide pro-
cesses, those who identified with Han-ness constructed and maintained boundaries
between themselves and “uncivilized others” by cultivating specific rites, using family
names, constructing genealogies, and more.
Alongside transformations in the political arena, at the turn of the nineteenth
century, political and intellectual Han elites redefined quite diametrically the role and
meaning of “Han,” in an effort to reimagine it as national community with a common
ancestor and a linear national history. This national imagery was later also adopted by
the Communists, who additionally glorified “the Han” as a world-leading revolutionary
nation. It should thus be emphasized that the Han minzu is not a category produced
by distant state institutions. Rather, it is a collective category that has been reinvented
by those who have identified with Han-ness themselves in pursuit of specific interests,
and has emerged in a complex interplay of local and state-wide processes. Therefore I
argue that minzu, particularly in the context of the Han, is not necessarily stiff or arbitra-
rily imposed,17 although the Han-dominated state certainly reinforces it for its own sake.
When it comes to local identity categories, three popular Chinese-language terms
are employed: ren, min, and jia. All of them can be translated as “people” or “person,”
16For a detailed analysis of this process see Mullaney (2011).
17Yet, we should not forget that the label was imposed onto some local groups and was denied to
others during the process of minzu recognition. For examples see Fei (1980).
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but each also has its distinct connotations. Most of the identity categories I collected in
my research were referred to with the term ren, which translates as a “person” or a “native
of,” the locality aspect being well-pronounced. While ren is indisputably the most
common designation, some of the local identity categories are referred to with the
term jia, for instance in the socionym Kejia (“guests,” “guest families”). The term jia
can be translated either as “family,” “household,” “members of one family name
group,” or as a “family engaged in a certain occupation,” which implies a stronger
kinship basis. The third term, min, absent in my research material but present in litera-
ture in the terms Danmin (Boat Person or Boat People) (E. Anderson 1972) or Duomin
(Fallen Person or Fallen People) (Cole 1982), translates as “a person of a certain occu-
pation” or a “civilian.” It emphasizes occupational identity. Now classified as Hanzu,
Duomin and Danmin once belonged to the category of jianmin (“demeaned people,”
“déclassé”), who, unlike “commoners” (liangmin, also “decent people”), engaged in occu-
pations of low social status that were often hereditary (see Eberhard 1962).
Each of these three terms, ren, jia, andmin, has different connotations. Ren refers to
identity bound to locality; jia is kinship-related, connoting a household or a family; andmin
refers broadly to occupation and civilian status. These terms are critical in understanding
the historical background of local identity-categories in China and the paradigms on which
they were constructed. The terms suggest that locality-bonds, occupational specialization,
kin-bonds, and family-names used to be important identity coordinates. As my research
evidences, these terms have also moved into the twenty-first century, where they continue
to be practiced. I argue that the understanding of their connotations and their intertwine-
ment is crucial to the discussion of ethnicity. That these categories connotemultiple mem-
bership and nonexclusivity is unavoidable and preprogrammed; hence, it is perfectly
compatible to be simultaneously, for example, a “native of Fujian,” Kejia, and Hanzu.
That most, though not all, of my interviewees did not express objections to the fact
that these various place-, occupation-, and kinship-based identity categories are all
lumped together under the category of Han minzu suggests that Han-making projects
have been largely successful. In my experience, only very few people classified as
Hanzu would insist on being divided into distinct Hakka minzu, Beijing minzu, Canto-
nese minzu, and so on.18 I doubt that any of my informants would voluntarily give up
Hanzu membership to become exclusively Cantonese, exclusively Hakka, or exclusively
Pekinese, despite the importance they may attach to these identity labels. The Han, as
“the core of the nation,” have been ascribed extreme political and social relevance, as
well as historical and cultural greatness. Hence, membership in the category offers
access to potent symbolic resources that very few seem willing to give up.19 This was
clearly evidenced during the interviews, where at any reference to non-Han minzu,
18Compare this with Carrico’s (2012) study in Guangdong, which finds people actually calling for
the independence of Guangdong from the North. Yet, I understand this call to be aimed at the revi-
sion of power relationships with Northerners rather than at independence from Han-ness.
19But see for instance Halskov Hansen (2005, 40), who reports of Han cadres in Sipsong Panna
registering their children as “minorities.” Also, children of mixed couples (Han and non-Han)
have the right to choose between the minzu affiliations of their parents; apparently, they often
decide to identify as a “minority,” as this status connotes certain advantages (e.g., permission to
legally have more children, priority access to positions in local governments, and extra points for
the entry exams to universities).
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the majority of my informants promptly abandoned their discussion of intra-Han differ-
entiation, and turned instead to reiterating “the Han” as a powerful national majority and
the big brother of other “nationalities.”
CONCLUSIONS: IS THIS ETHNICITY?
Although I agree with Tapper (1988) that the use of local categories of identity is
crucial in the early stages of analysis, I believe it is equally important to go beyond the
“locality” and specificity of the Chinese context at the advanced stage of analysis and con-
sider a more universal query, namely: Are minzu, ren, min, and jia ethnic? Are the
relationships they form relationships of ethnicity?
Ethnicity has been most often referred to as an ongoing process of identification
between at least two collective actors: “us” and “them.” As Wallman (1979, 3) argues,
“Ethnicity is the process by which ‘their’ difference is used to enhance the sense of
‘us’ for purposes of organization or identification”; hence it can only happen at the bound-
ary of “us,” in contact or by contrast with “them” (see also Jenkins 1997, 53). Whereas the
interactive relationship between “us” and “them” is certainly crucial to ethnicity, Barth
(1994, 19–20), Harrell (1996), and Gladney (1998) urge us to see the state as a third com-
ponent in processes of ethnicity. Harrell (1996, 274) emphasizes that “ethnic conscious-
ness and identity arise in a three-way interplay between a group that considers itself
distinctive, neighboring groups from which the group distinguishes itself and the state,
which establishes categories . . . and distributes benefits.” Likewise, Cole and Wolf
([1974] 1999) demonstrate that local processes of boundary making can only be under-
stood when linked to the work of the states and to developments on the macro-scale
with which they remain in a relationship of mutual dependence.
Benedict Anderson (1983, 15) points out that “all communities are imagined”; only the
ways in which they are imagined differ. Hence, whereas processes of categorization and
identification are universal, they are not always ethnic (see Brubaker 2004; Martiniello
1995). What is it, then, that makes ethnicity different from social categorization? Contrary
to social organization forms, ethnicity is not always voluntary. Nor is it necessarily instru-
mental. Moreover, ethnicity, especially in times of mobilization, tends to employ essentialist
discourses of shared culture, shared blood, common origin, and common history (Eriksen
2002; Jenkins 1997; Roosens 1989). The belief in common descent, history, and shared
culture, as well as the sense of shared destiny, are essential to ethnicity. It is a notion
that builds on continuity in time, both imagined and actual. Reliance on ideologies of
common ancestry, history, and culture, all of which project the present onto the past, con-
stitutes the core strategy of ethnic boundary-making and maintenance (Barth [1969] 1996).
As Harrell (2001) argues, ethnicity can manifest in various ways but will mostly combine
these three aspects: culture (the so-called “ethnic markers” that make “us” similar to one
another but different from “them”), kinship (imagined and actual), and history (invented
continuity within “us” and the history of conflict with “them”). When not in situations of
confrontation and conflict, ethnicity seems to be quite flexible; it does not need to be
framed in essentialist terms and can be practiced as a non-total, non-exclusive, instrumen-
tal, and situational paradigm. This flexibility is only restricted by the relational quality of
ethnicity, which necessitates the recognition of the switches and negotiations performed
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by not only other “us” but also “them.”Hence, until the moment of confrontation, beyond
which switches in ethnicity are made more difficult by exclusivist and essentialist narratives,
distinguishing between social and ethnic identities is a difficult task. Still, I believe it makes
sense to draw boundaries around the concept of ethnicity. If we label every form of categ-
orization process “ethnic,” it will quickly lose its meaning and relevance. To keep this
concept useful, social, ethnic, and national categorization processes should be kept analyti-
cally distinct to the extent that the fluid, changing reality permits. This will allow for an
understanding of each categorization process in its own right, a thorough recognition of
its specificities, and a discussion of its effects. To meaningfully apply the concept of ethni-
city to my research material, I explore in the remainder of this paper the idea of “degree of
ethnicity” and “transitory ethnicity,” suggesting that whereas the Han identity is more
ethnic, the ren, min, and jia identities appear to a lesser degree ethnic and more transitory
in their ethnicity. I explain my claim below.
Exclusivity
The first difference between the minzu category and the ren, min, and jia categories
is connected to the concept of exclusivity. As I have demonstrated above, the ren, jia, and
min categories connote multiple membership. Indeed, due to their different connota-
tions, multiple membership in these categories is virtually unavoidable. As they are con-
ceptualized and used, these categories are nonexclusive. Many of my interviewees
emphasized having multiple attachments to ren and jia categories. However, exclusivity
is an important element of ethnic discourses, if not of ethnic realities. Particularly in times
of mobilization, loyalty to one ethnic category is expected. Hence, I argue that in contem-
porary China, ren, jia, and min identities are too overlapping, mutually inclusive, and
intertwined to discursively connote ethnicity.
While earlier the relationship between local identities and Han-ness has been differ-
ent, from the nineteenth century onward, the mobilizing power of ren, min, and jia iden-
tities have been challenged by an increasingly powerful notion of Han-ness (compare
Giersch 2012). Also in the twentieth century, central governments invested great
efforts in narrating local identities as secondary to Han-ness. Likely because of this, in
a stark contrast to ren, min, and jia attachments, the overwhelming majority of my inter-
viewees perceived the boundaries between the Han minzu and other minzu as discur-
sively obvious, clear-cut, and impassable.20
Flexibility
The second point refers to flexibility, a notion directly related to exclusivity. My
research material demonstrates that the ren, min, and jia identities are much easier to
access and easier to switch between thanminzu. Also, because they are not state-regulated,
20The fact that the interviews were carried out in Han-dominated cities might have had a significant
influence on this structure of responses. In multiethnic areas, other paradigms could potentially be
more important than minzu for identification. In earlier research in southwest Sichuan, I observed
that minzu identities coexisted with ethnic identities from the pre-Communist period. Though
classified today as one minzu, some ethnic groups would not intermarry (e.g., Prmi and Bo,
which were both classified as “Tibetans”). Simultaneously, others who were classified as two differ-
ent minzu would (e.g., Prmi and Na, classified as “Mongol”).
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access to and shifts between them are more widespread than between minzu. Ethnicity,
however, because it involves the third actor—the state, and a recognition by an
“other”—is not always flexible and voluntary. In relational terms, ren and jia identities
are today much more flexible and individual-dependent than Han-ness. For instance,
although most of the interviewees emphasized that native place was extremely important
to them, what they actually defined as “native place” was defined in accordance with their
current situation. Native place was thus variously understood as father’s place of origin or
birth, mother’s place of origin or birth, current place of living, hukou location, birthplace,
place where one grew up, and more. Additionally, it became clear in our interviews that
Han individuals maintained and shifted between multiple ren and jia attachments. My
informants exhibited a number of native place or ren identities that were non-exclusive
and could be flexibly switched. If a person had lived for some years in Beijing, she
might start referring to herself as “native of Beijing” when confronted with more recent
migrants. On the other hand, when confronted with Han from her birthplace, she
would refer to herself using her birthplace identity. It also happened that interviewees
ascribed to themselves native-place identities with which they wished to be identified,
for instance as “natives of Shanghai,” instead of clinging to labels that were lower on the
social hierarchies. Thus, every interviewee had a number of native-place identities that
were nonexclusive and could be flexibly switched. AlthoughHan-ness is sometimes instru-
mentalized too, a similar degree of flexibility is hard to imagine on the scale ofminzu cat-
egorization. Unlike the ren, min, and jia categories, minzu are imagined, and to a great
extent also lived by Han individuals as stable, given, and mutually exclusive categories of
identity. This representation of minzu identities is obviously enforced by a powerful
state apparatus, which contributes significantly to the prevalence of such imagery.
Shifting Scales and the State
The third point of my argument involves scales of interaction, and the role of state
policies in determining the meaning of these scales. As I have observed in non-Han domi-
nated areas, particularly in the region of Xinjiang, divisions into rural and urban Han, into
natives of Shanghai, Guangdong, or the Northeast, or into Northerners and Southerners
are quickly downgraded when Han are exposed to aminzu “other.” The Han, fragmented
otherwise by numerous boundaries of native place or occupation, tend to promptly dis-
regard this fragmentation and identify with their Han-ness when exposed to otherminzu.
When a Sichuanren comes across a Uyghur in Xinjiang, he or she tends to not emphasize
his or her Sichuan native place identity. Rather, the Sichuanren would here typically
emphasize his or her Han-ness. This is because the Han minzu and the Uyghur minzu
exist in a mutually reifying relationship that has a clear ethnic quality, as discussed
above. While important in other situations, the fragmented native place, occupation,
and kinship identities of the Han are irrelevant to this relationship. These identities
relate to and exist at different scales of interaction. With regard to the Han, I argue
that this scale of minzu-to-minzu interactions is more ethnic than the scale of ren, min,
and jia identities.21 Ethnic identity, in order to fulfill its purpose, must also be performed
21With regard to other minzu, including those that became combinations of a number of ethnic
groups, the situation might be diametrically different.
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in relation to some “others.” The Han minzu has very clear “others” in the form of
the fifty-five so-called “minorities.” With regard to Sichuanren, Henanren, Wuhanren,
Zhejiangren, or Wenzhouren, these “others” are very diffuse. My impression is that
these categories do not have very clear “others”; rather, they coexist in a relational
system of identification against some andwith others. For instance, numerous interviewees
said that Shandongren are like Dongbeiren, or that Zhejiangren are like Shanghairen.
According to selected criteria, however, “alliances” and “others” shift. For instance, accord-
ing to the criteria of language, categories regarded as similar to “us” will not be the same as
when the criteria of “cultural quality” or “progress” is used for categorization. Hence, I
argue that the aim of differentiations and categorizations on the scale of ren, min, and
jia identities is not about drawing excluding boundaries between a specific “us” in relation
to a specific “them.” Rather, it involves locating and positioning oneself in a relational
system formed by multiple ren, min, and jia identities that fluctuate in relation to multiple
reference points.
Accordingly I argue that the ren, min, and jia categories do not possess a similar
degree of “density” and exclusivity like minzu. To compare, would the boundaries
between Uyghur and Han become less salient if they met outside of China? Would
the international scale render Han-ness and Uyghur-ness unimportant? From my obser-
vations, it would not. The national Chinese identity does not have the power to make
ethnic boundaries between Han and Uyghur irrelevant. The same cannot be said in a
similar degree about the relationship between ren, min, or jia identities. Although differ-
ences in language or native place may be registered, their influence on social practice will
be relatively less significant. In these differentiated relationships, the role of state as the
third actor in the processes of ethnicity becomes again explicitly manifest. Because ren,
jia, and min identities are not promoted as collective identities by the state, they are not
capable of achieving a degree of “density” similar to the institutionalized minzu. In the
PRC, where the government presence is so pervasive, the state component in processes
of ethnicity should be given even more weight than elsewhere.
I believe the notions of relationality, degree, and scales are of utmost importance to
the discussions of ethnicity. In the three points above, I argue that while the Hanminzu is
related to other minzu in China by a relationship of ethnicity, ren, min, and jia categories
are less ethnic and more social in relation to one another and to theminzu. They overlap,
they do not claim exclusivity, and they lack the mobilizing energy of the minzu. The
importance of these categories fades as scales of interaction change in instances of con-
frontation with other minzu because they lack the institutional backing of the state.
However, I believe that in regions where a minzu “other” is not present in daily inter-
actions, ren, min, and jia attachments become “ethnic,” albeit in a transitory way. Like-
wise, an urban-rural, or migrants-locals boundary might become ethnic in
Han-dominated environments like eastern Chinese cities. In such settings, these identi-
ties are viewed as more meaningful and emotional22 than Han-ness; they assume the
cloak of primordiality and also have certain organizational functions. From my
22Fifty-one out of ninety-one research participants declared that they felt emotionally more
attached to the ren and jia categories than tominzu. However, these results must be contextualized
by where I conducted my interviews: in the Han-dominated cities of Beijing and Shanghai, where
ethnic “others” are often relatively difficult to locate.
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observations, however, whenever Han-ness is perceived to be threatened, the ethnicity of
these categories diminishes. The success of Han-making projects is manifest in the fact
that ren, min, and jia categories have become to a significant degree naturalized as
“Han.” As my informants demonstrated, these categories are currently conceived of as
parts of the same symbolic entity, the Han minzu. Hence, in contemporary China,
being Hanzu is perfectly compatible with having additional ren, min, and jia identities.
Each of these identities has a certain function and is relationally and situationally mean-
ingful. While Han-ness helps the Hanzu position themselves in relation to other minzu,
non-minzu identities help them orientate and position themselves in relation to other
Hanzu.
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